ROLE OF ARMY HQ AND ARMY TOP BRASS
In continuation to my previous post I will try to bring out the untold facts about casual and laid back attitude of the then GOC 3 Div Maj Gen V S Budhwar and the general staff officers (GS branch) of the HQ 3DIV.Also here I would like to mention few facts about the attitude of the then army chief COAS Gen V.P.Malikbefore the actual kargil operation undertaken by our gallant soldiers.
In todays newspaper (TOI) while laying wreath at the memorial built in the memory of our gallant soldiers, Gen Malik said and I quote”that the attack by Pakistan army and built up by them had taken the Indian army by surprise.”he further stated ‘at first we thought it were mere some militants who were trying to infiltrate .But as soon helicopters started to hover and arty fire began to fire , we were surprised to see bombardment from that side”
This statement from Gen V.P Malik surprised me a lot as it was already intimated to him by various letter written by general staff branch including Brig Surinder Sing (then Cdr of 121 Inf Bde) of 121 Inf Bde airing the views of possible attack from Kargil and drass sector and the massive movement of guns and troops by the Pakistan army as per the intelligence report.But Gen VP malik chose to ignore it, the reason for the same is best known to him only and only he can answer.But if Gen malik says he is surprised by the attack,and was not aware of the facts then someone should remind him that on August 25, 1998, Major R.K. Dwivedi, the Brigade-Major (BM 121 Inf Bde)of the 121 Brigade, sent out a letter and attached the letter and the contents of Surinder Singh's proposed briefing of Gen V.P.Malik (then COAS) on the security situation in Kargil, scheduled to take place during the Chief of the Army Staff's visit to Kargil the following month. The 42-point document was, during the final presentation, backed by slides. The slides also included the intelligence report of the massive troop deployment across the border including movement of NLI (Northern Light Infantry of Pakistan).
Gen Malik, perhaps the most politician-friendly Army chief India has ever seen, responded to Brig. Surinder Singh's warnings of intensified conflict by burying his head in the sand.He ordered the 121 Brigade not to use heavy weapons to retaliate against Pakistan fire directed at National Highway 1A. A deal restricting the use of heavy weapons by both India and Pakistan was put in place after firing started on Kargil early in the summer of 1998. This, merely allowed Pakistan to rebuild its positions. More important, it was skewed to India's disadvantage. Malik, desperate for a deal, had allowed Pakistan to continue "interdicting NH 1A, as Air Defense was not included in the ban. Having put together some kind of peace in Kargil, even at the risk of advertising its post-Pokhran-II limitations, the top Army leadership was not about to listen to the alarms sounded by a mere Brigadier. Surinder Singh's requests for additional troops and air surveillance were variously ignored and shot down.
In view of these facts it is clear the Gen V.P.Malik (then COAS) just ignored the warnings of the brigade and chose not to take any action on the reports sent by the 121 Inf Bde HQ.So the statement of Gen V.P.Malik (then COAS ) in today’s Times Of india is not true and he has hidden the true facts even today which has surprised me a lot as this proves that he is trying to shield the incompetence of the ministry of defense at the highest level during the BJP led govt at the center.
Role Of 3 Div HQ and Maj Gen V S Budhwar
On one side the brigade HQ was trying to sound alarming bells of the possible attack from across the border by sending numerous letter to the DIV HQ but the GS(operation) branch chose to ignore it. Numerous request for additional troops were turned down and above that to add salt to insult on the competence of Brig.Surinder Singh, the 3 Div ordered the withdrawal of 9 Mahar Regiment, leaving the Yaldor area wide open.
The height of this is , instead of giving additional troop and air cover to the 121 Inf Bde,the brigade was ordered assist in building the “PET PROJECT” Maj Gen V S Budhwar (then GOC 3 Div) which was a zoo for the resident of Leh. This was communicated to the brigade HQ of 121 Inf Bde by a letter from 3 Div HQ and signed by Lt Col U.K.Singh in June 1998.Lt Col U.K.Singh in his letter stated that all the formation unit must procure various type of wild animals and birds for the project and no representation in this regards will be entertained at 3DIV HQ ,this being the “PET PROJECT “ of the then GOC 3DIV Gen V.S.Budhwar.
On one side the Cdr of 121 Inf Bde was worried about possible attack and above that he received this type of letter ,inspite of repeated request for additional troops and air support, for Maj Gen V S Budhwar, the zoo was more important than the lives of the soldier who were killed later on during the Kargil conflict.
Major K.B.S. Khurana, the officer commanding the 1/S23 Intelligence and Field Security Unit at Kargil, had altogether other kinds of wildlife on his mind. He was referring to disturbing information brought to his attention by a source referred "that 500 Afghan militants have been brought to Gurikot, NJ 7959, to be further inducted into Ind ia in the near future." The "most likely route of infiltratio)" was through the Kel nala, on through the Safaid nala, into the Kaobal gali, and through to Pindras, Drass and Muskhoh. The information was graded fairly reliable.
Inspite of the intelligence reports received from brigade HQ (which had forwarded the report of Maj K.B.S.Khurna) Maj Gen V S Budhwar , eh chose to ignore the early warnings of the brigade which resulted in heavy loss of life for our gallant officers and men in Kargil war.
Instead, the politically driven ostrich posture adopted at the highest levels of the Army command eventually shaped the institutional functioning of the 121 Brigade itself. After the loss of the battle over additional troops, weapons and air surveillance , drift appears to have set in. Winter patrols were set out largely on paper, and posts were often vacated when there was no real reason to do so. Maj Gen Budhwar's obsessive determination to avoid winter casualties in aggressive patrolling led Brig. Surinder Singh, in turn, to take a laid-back attitude after December. Maj Gen Budhwar's actions, for their part, appear to have been motivated by the conviction that the warnings generated on Kargil were frivolous, an attitude his superiors were only too happy to en ourage. The consequences of this apathy became evident when soldiers were brought back dead the next summer.
In view of the above facts I can deduce, that It is clear that the build-up of irregulars detected by the Intelligence and Field Security Unit, as well as the movement of additional Pakistan troops into the Kargil sector, in fact constituted preparations for the war of 1999. It is also clear, with the wisdom of hindsight, that the 121 Brigade misinterpreted what it saw as preparations for infiltrating terrorists, rather than groundwork for a full-blown conventional engagement. But it is also worth noting that the Pakistan Army made elaborate arrangements to ensure that the first groups of its personnel who crossed the LoC were able to pretend to be irregulars. Had the warnings been taken seriously and requests for heightened surveillance and personnel been acceded to, it is at the very least possible that Pakistan's early offensive would have been detected and engaged, saving hundreds of Indian soldiers' live
To be contd……………
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