1
ae lehad apni mitti se keh
de daag lagne na payee kafan ko
lipta hua hai safeed chadar me jo
seecha hai khoon se usne watan ko
# my tribute to the gallant soldiers who laid down their lives defending the nation#Today India celebrates the 12th anniversary of the troops victory in Kargil and Drass sector.The battle at the heights were fought gallantry by our soldiers not only facing the enemy heavy arty and gun fire but also the weather and many of them did not return home. In this series of untold story of Kargil war, I will try to give some facts which has been untold and how our so called political bosses in New Delhi slept over the reports and preferred to burry their head in sand like an ostrich ,which resulted in heavy casualties for our troops.
The BJP govt headed by Sri Atal Behari Bajpayee and the then defence Minister Mr.George Fernandes not only ignored the early warning sent out by 121 Inf Bde but rubbished it as “over reaction to situation” by the army.
To substantiate my findings on the incompetence of the staff of ministry of defence and the then defence minister, I would like to quote following facts
On August 25, 1998, Major R.K. Dwivedi, the Brigade-Major of the 121 Brigade, sent out a letter about the contents of Brig.Surinder Singh's proposed briefing of GenMalik on the security situation in Kargil, scheduled to take place during the Chief of the Army Staff's visit to Kargil the following month. The 42-point document was, during the final presentation, backed by slides which was also presented to the then defense minister George Fernandez.
Right at the outset, the 121 Brigade briefing paper analyzed, in terse military shorthand, the possible "Enemy) Pattern" for the coming months. Pakistan would seek to keep conflict "alive after (the Pokhran-II) nuclear blasts and in view of the SAARC meeting of 29 Ju 98 and now for (the) NAM meeting." This could come in the form of a "push (by) militants across the LOC. Pakistan troops would, among other thing, engage NH (National Highway) IA with AD (Air Defence) weapons", "target selected forward posts", and "hit Kargil and outlying villages, if escalation of war takes place.
The letter also explained the "Enhanced Threat Perception", laid out the reasons for the 121 Brigade's apprehensions because fresh Pakistan troop movements, including the deployment of the 24 Sind Regiment, a reserve division from Gilgit, to forward positions at Olthingthang. Another battalion, the paragraph records, had moved "on priority" from Sialkot to Skardu. Heavy and medium guns had been inducted into the sector,along with M-1 98 155 millimetre mortar, and light flashes, possibly laser designators for smart weapons or missiles, had been seen over Drass and Kargil.
The Letter also gave detailed Vulnerabilities of the 121 Inf Bde and also pointed out the fact that National Highway 1A was vulnerable to fire from Pakistan positions on Twin Bumps, Bunker Ridge and Point 3249, Kargil and its rear areas were open to shelling. It laid out a whole new order of vulnerability. It pointed out that "infiltration routes were available through Mashkoh Valley, from Doda side to Panikhar, Yaldor and through nalas (streams)". Small detachments could be targeted, existence of posts were vulnerable to "rogue action". 121 Brigade left little doubt that trouble had already begun. 45 Pakistan soldiers dressed as irregulars, had already moved across the LoC in the Kargil area. In order to address the emerging situation, the letter also gave a spectrum of new weapons, mainly heavy artillery and missiles, was urgently needed. It also called, for the use of "one air OP (observation flight) for observation and direction of fire/casualty evacuation to be located at Kargil". It also demanded the deployment of a remotely piloted vehicle, among other things, and a regular supply of aerial photos and satellite images. All these in the detail report submitted by 121 Inf bde is worth noting, as the same were indeed used once the 1999 war broke out.
It is important to mention here that the Bharatiya Janata Party-led Union government just did not want to hear about trouble on the LoC. Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayeeand the then Defence Minister George Fernandez had legitimized the Pokhran-II tests by describing nuclear weapons as "weapons of peace". A string of the kinds of people who pass for intellectuals in the BJP had in turn insisted that Pokhran-II, and indeed Pakistan's retaliatory tests at Chagai, would usher in a new era of peace in South Asia.
Having put together some kind of peace in Kargil, even at the risk of advertising its post-Pokhran-II limitations, the top leaders of BJP led govt at the centre and the defence minister was not ready to listen to the alarms sounded by a mere Brig.Surinder Singh's ( the then Cdr of 121 Inf Bde and himself a decorated soldier and a battle casualty) and his requests for additional troops and air surveillance were variously ignored and shot down and taken very lightly at the Ministry of Defence.
121 Inf Bde further dispatched letters after letter requesting for additional asking for heightened wide-area surveillance was also turned down and were informed not to shout “bediya aaya bediya aaya (cry wolf coming).The then Captain Vikas Vohra, officiating for the Brigade Major(BM 121 Inf Bde)sent another letter and requested again for "one helicopter flight / single heptr to be positioned permanently at Kargil for wide area surveillance(WASO) was also turned down. This led to further frustration among the officers of the 121 Inf Bde as they were aware of the ground reality and were not prepared if any form of intrusion or attack from that sector because of lack of air support and intelligence report ,which could have had by air surveillance of that area.
Capt.Vohra's letter made plain the need for heightened air surveillance. "Declaring Mashkoh nala as Priority IV, "needs to be reviewed in view of the flow of intelligence reports, listing out militant activity opposite Mashkoh valley. It therefore surely merits a higher priority. With these troops scheduled for removal, Vohra's letter pointed out, weekly WASO flights were also needed in the Garkhun and Hanuthang nalas as well.
Division formation HQ took the best part of a fortnight to get back to this letter. Major V.K. Chattre, General Staff Officer 2 (GSO2) of the Div HQ wasted few words. "Your proposal is not approved," in reply to Capt Vohra’s lettter. 15 Corps Headquarters at that time in charge of the 3 Infantry Division, did not see fit to intervene in the debate. Requests for additional troops were not even graced with a reply. One letter generated by the 121 Brigade's Major R.K. Dwivedi, on behalf of Brig.Surinder Singh (then Cdr 121 inf Bde)gave report of a recent mine explosion on the highway, and underlined the need for troops to protect the road and vulnerable villages. No troops were deployed. Instead, despite the 121 Brigade's protests, the 9 Mahar Regiment was actually withdrawn, leaving the Yaldor area wide open.
Though the officers of the 121 Inf Bde kept on sending signals and messages to their higher formation about the threat perception, but the top brass and the Political leaders just chose to ignore it and did not paid any heed to it.
It was clear in the minds of the officer and Cdr of 121 Inf Bde that the build-up of irregulars detected by the Intelligence and Field Security Unit, as well as the movement of additional Pakistan troops into the Kargil sector, in fact constituted preparations for the war of 1999. It is also clear, with the wisdom of hindsight, that the 121 Brigade misinterpreted what it saw as preparations for infiltrating terrorists, rather than groundwork for a full-blown conventional engagement. But it is also worth noting that the Pakistan Army made elaborate arrangements to ensure that the first groups of its personnel who crossed the LoC were able to pretend to be irregulars. Had the warnings been taken seriously and requests for heightened surveillance and personnel been acceded to, it is at the very least possible that Pakistan's early offensive would have been detected and engaged, saving hundreds of Indian soldiers' lives.
Instead of heading to the advice and giving Brig Surinder Singh ,SM,VSM his capabilities was doubted and the politically driven ostrich posture adopted at the highest levels of the defense ministry eventually shaped the institutional functioning of the 121 Brigade itself. After the loss of the battle over additional troops, weapons and air surveillance , drift appears to have set in. Winter patrols were set out largely on paper, and posts were often vacated when there was no real reason to do so. Sources say Budhwar's obsessive determination to avoid winter casualties in aggressive patrolling led Brig.Surinder Singh, in turn, to take a laid-back attitude after December as like the winter setting in Kashmir, frustration had set in him. The consequences of this apathy became evident when soldiers were brought back dead the next summer.
To be contd……..
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