KARGIL WAR - UNTOLD FACTS - V

KARGIL WAR - - V

Before I start the actual description of the fact of Kargil war I would first like to give a brief account and description of the troops mobilized by the Pakistan army during the Kargil conflict.

Pakistan army had mobilized more than 5000 troops and they were mainly drawn from the following regiments and battalions:

• 5 NLI battalion
• 6 NLI battalion
• 12 NLI battalion
• 13 NLI battalion
• 24 SIND
• 27 SIND
• HQ 10 corps

Apart from the above mentioned troops the Pakistan army also mobilized the Pakistan Rangers (equivalent to BSF of India).Pakistan Rangers were also shifted from main land to the Mushko valley and Kargil and Drass sector in order to give support to the main army of Pakistan.

The Main task of the Pakistan rangers was to give back and logistic support and maintain the supply line of the Pakistan army so that there is no hindrance in that supply line. Also they were tasked to carry out additional duty of occupying the high ridges and build bunkers and defence post so that the Pakistan army has no difficulty in occupying the post.

The Pakistan army 10 corps was tasked to occupy the heights and they formulated the battle plan which can be termed as follows :-

323 Brigadeof the Pakistan army  occupied some of the dominating features overlooking Turtok and Gora Lungpa by the third week of April 1999,in the Chorbat La sector. The battalions also readjusted and reinforced existing posts/complexes.

 62 Brigade conducted readjustment of their troops in the Ladakh Range, which led the 62 Brigade to occupy vacant heigh in  the Gragrabar and Gragrio Nullahs.

80 Brigade also readjusted their troops in the watersheds in Shaqma and Buniyal sectors to give cover support to 62 brigade overlooking Batakulain Nullah.

Apart from these, many more troops from the artillery and armoured regiments were also pooled in to support the Pakistan 10 corps and worked as support system to the troops during the Kargil Conflict.

 

On one side Gen Parvez Musharraf was telling the world that there are no Pakistan troops in the Kargil and drass sector ,but on the other side the troops were mobalised ,so that they can cut off the supply line of the Indian troops stationed at Siachen glacier and Ladakh region .

The exiled Prime Minister of Pakistan has also quoted in an interview that Gen Pervez Musharraf had moved nuclear warheads during the Kargil war so that they could be used against India. This  could have led to a greater disaster and catastrophe had the mad Gen Pervez Musharraf succeeded in his one point agenda that is to defeat India in a war.

Nawaz Sheriff the former prime minister of Pakistan also said in an interview and I quote “During my post-Kargil misadventure meeting with American President (Bill) Clinton, I was told by the American leader that the nuclear warheads had been shifted from one station to the other during the Kargil War.
I was taken aback by this revelation because I knew nothing about it. “The American President further told me during the meeting that the nuclear warheads have been moved so that these could be used against India.

TO BE CONTD…

KARGIL WAR - UNTOLD FACTS -IV

Further to my earlier post regarding the Kargil War, in the following chapters, I will try to analyze the facts and the run to the actual Kargil conflict between Indian troops and Pakistan army in brief . The entire conflict can be termed into three major phases.

First, Pakistan infiltrated forces into the Indian-controlled section of Kashmir and occupied strategic locations enabling it to bring NH1 within range of its artillery fire. 

The next stage consisted of India discovering the infiltration and mobilizing forces to respond to it.

 The final stage involved major battles by Indian and Pakistani forces resulting in India recapturing the territory held by Pakistani forces and the subsequent withdrawal of Pakistani forces back across the Line of Control after their defeat and international pressure.

Phase -1

Pakistan troops occupying Indian posts

Occupation by Pakistan

Infiltration and military build-up.

During the winter season, due to extreme cold in the snow-capped mountainous areas of Kashmir, it was a common practice for both the Indian and Pakistan Armies to abandon some forward posts on their respective sides of the LOC and to reduce patrolling of areas that may be avenues of infiltration. When weather conditions became less severe, forward posts would be reoccupied and patrolling resumed.
During February 1999,on the orders of Gen Pervez Musharraf, the Pakistan Army began to re-occupy the posts it had abandoned on its side of the LOC in the Kargil region, but also sent forces to occupy some posts on the Indian side of the LOC. Troops from the elite Special Services Group as well as four to seven battalions of the Northern Light Infantry covertly and overtly set up bases on the vantage points of the Indian-controlled region.

These Pakistani forces were backed by Kashmiri guerrillas and Afghan mercenaries who were used as porters and guide to occupy the positions.
Pakistani intrusions took place in the heights of the lower Mushkoh Valley, along the Marpo La ridgeline in Dras, in Kaksar near Kargil, in the Batalik sector east of the Indus River, on the heights above of the Chorbatla sector where the LOC turns North and in the Turtok sector south of the Siachen area.

By occupying these posts, the Pakistan army had clear cut tasked for them that is to cut off the NHIA and the supply roots of the Indian troops to Leh and Ladakh sector. Since they were at the dominating height, the Pakistan forward observation post could easily direct the artillery fire at the Indian position which could cause considerable damage to Indian troops and its positions (as it did in the initial stages when the petrol bunker of the brigade headquarters were damaged by the artillery shelling).

When the Indian Govt objected to the Pakistan Govt, regarding the unproved firing, Gen Pervez Musharraf, denied any knowledge of the firing from Pakistan side. A statement in this was issued from Pakistan (by Gen Pervez Musharraf) in this regard that the Pakistan troops have not fired on any Indian position. Indian defence ministry kept quiet and took the press release of the Pakistani’s at face value in order not to escalate the tension between the two countries. This was the biggest blunder by the Indian defence ministry, as it encouraged the Pakistan army in their further endeavor to occupy Indian side of LOC. 

Sensing Indian army mood , the Pakistan army moved its arty further near the LOC in that sector and re-enforced it troops with more addition troops. The Pakistan army started occupying all the vantage position at the heights and in this they took the help of so called Kashmiri militants and Afghan mercenaries.

By May 1999, Pakistan armies had constructed bunkers and were well dug in with shelters and supplies of ration and arms and ammunition, to sustain them for a long period of battle which Gen Pervez Musharraf had in his mind with the Indian troops.

The blue print of the intrusion and attack was formulated by Gen Pervez Musharraf, when he took over the reins of Pakistan army in 1998. This plan was kept totally secret and only few of his trusted generals of ISI and artillery knew about this plans and had started preparing for it.the infiltration to the Indian side and occupation of the dominating heights in Kargil and Drass sector was code name “OPERATION BADR”

Earlier also the Pakistan army and its Gen had given similar proposal to Msbenazir Bhutto but it was turned down as it may have resulted into full blown conflict between India and Pakistan .But when Gen Musharraf took over the command of the Pakistan army, without informing the civilian govt started his work on the plan as he thought ,if he informs the Govt then the Pakistan Govt may turn down his plan once again .In this Plan along with Gen Pervez Musharraf, Gen Kiyani (present army chief of Pakistan and then ISI chief) and Gen S Pasha (present ISI chief of Pakistan) were involved. These three Gen used to meet often on pretext of army meeting and then plan out their strategies for OPERATION BADR.

Gen Pervez Musharraf did not want the failure like OPERATION GIBRALTAR, which resulted in full scaled war in 1965 and the subsequent defeat of Pakistan army again.To minimize the leaks only few trusted men were involved as the former DGMI of Pakistan army Lt Gen Jamshed Gulzar Kiyani accepted  later on after his retirement from the Pakistan army.

                                                                                                 To be Contd.......

KARGIL WAR - UNTOLD FACTS -III

EXPOSING Gen PERVEZ MUSHARRAF LIES

In further continuation of my post on the Kargil war –Untold facts ,in this chapter I would like to bring out the role of Gen Musharraf and how he lied not only to the Pakistan Govt but to the entire world about the role of Pak army.Till end Gen Musharraf  refused to accept the fact that the Pakistan army were in direct conflict with Indian soldiers in Kargil and Drass sector. Though it was crystal clear that the Northern Light Infantry supported by Pakistan artillery had infiltrated in the Indian side of LOC.

In the year 1999, the then Prime Minister of India Mr Bajpayee and the Pakistan President Mr Nawaz sheriff were trying their best to normalize the relation between the two countries. In regards to this Mr Bajpayee inaugurated the Delhi –Lahore Bus service and personally traveled by that bus till Wagah border.

But Gen Pervez Musharraf the then COAS of Pakistan army (later on he seized power and appointed himself the military ruler of Pakistan)had other plans in his mind. Being commissioned in Pakistan army in 1964 as a second lieutenant in an artillery regiment as was serving the Pakistan army when the  war broke out with India in 1965, and he was a Battery Commander during the 1971 war with India , he could not tolerate the two defeats  that the Pakistan army suffered in the war against India in 1965 and 1971.From that time he had the dream to go into war with India once again and be victorious.

Gen Musharraf was well groomed and doctrined into this mind frame by non other than Gen Zia-Ul Haq (former COAS and President of Pakistan who had similar dream after the defeat of Pakistan army in 1971)

Since Gen Musharraf tactics of indirect way of creating law and order problem in Kashmir was not resulting in full blown war between the two countries, he started his master plan of sending troops across the LOC and they were to occupy the post in Kargil and Drass sector during winter. They were tasked to hit the NH1A and disrupt the supply line to leh sector of the Indian army. The troops were initially ordered to be in civil uniform and not in usual combat dress and for this the Northern Light Infantry and troops of special services (ISI ) were selected. Gen Musharraf had thought that in one stroke he will cut the supply of the Leh sector and then have a dominating position from where he can dictate terms and capture Kashmir. This was his life long dream “to annex Kashmir for Pakistan” and be remembered by historians as Indira Gandhi is remembered for creating Bangladesh in 1971.

When Gen Musharraf was planning his devilish motives with his trusted men which included the present Army Chief Of Pakistan Gen Kiyani and the present ISI chief Lt.Gen Pasha (both were groomed by Gen Pervez Musharraf), he did not bothered to inform the higher authorities and the civil administration of Pakistan at that time as he thought this will hamper his plans and the civilian Govt of Pakistan may turn down his plan. But Nawaz sheriff got the wind of his whimsical plan and in a meeting with Gen Pervez Musharraf questioned him about his plan. There also Gen Musharraf lied to Nawaz Sherif and informed that he is just supporting the Hizbul Mujhahideen by supplying them some arms and ammunition and only few of his trusted ISI men were involved. Gen Musharraf also informed Nawaz sheriff that the Pakistan army is no way involved directly. He also told Nawaz Sheriff tht the redeployment of army (NLI)was taking place because he wanted new posts to be created on LOC in the area of Kargil and Drass sector. But in his mind Gen Musharraf had different plans. When his troops would capture the heights in Kargil and Drass sector, he will declare the territory as the territory of Pakistan to the world and Pakistan army has done no wrong but has just moved to occupy their area of control post. Had he succeeded in his devilish plan things would have been different today but that was not supposed to be.

The lies of Gen Musharraf  can also be made out from the interview given by Nawaz Sherrif  after being unceremoniously deported from the country to an urdu daily ,he said and I quote” that Kargil was a bigger disaster than 1965 and the 1971 wars because Pakistan lost over 2,700 soldiers. The entire Northern Light Infantry was wiped out. "When I reminded Musharraf of his claim that the operation will be risk-free, he replied that the Indians had resorted to carpet bombing, which looked rather naive to me," he said. "Didn't you know that this will happen?" Nawaz said he had asked his army chief. "Let me add here that Pakistanis fighting in Kashmir were without shelter, and some of the soldiers in the bunkers and outposts had been exposed to the extent that they lost their skulls by the dozens. The Indians were closing in on us when the Washington agreement was arrived at for an honourable pull back," he told the paper."

Gen Pervez Musharaf did not bother to inform the Pakistan navy and Air force before taking on such operation as this was his “PET PROJECT “ to defeat Indian army and annex Kashmir for Pakistan.

Before the operation of Kargil could take place and Pakistani troops moved up to occupy the heights of Kargil and Drass sector, Nawaz Sheriff wanted Gen Musharraf to give a proper briefing about it to the joint defence council which included the navy and air force chief of Pakistan so that the tension between Indian army and Pakistan army is not escalated in the LOC area.

A formal briefing of the entire operation was made for the benefit of the Prime Minister in April,in the presence of the other services. Since the CNS (chief of Naval staff)was on a visit abroad, the navy’s reaction was voiced cautiously, but the CAS (Chief of Air Staff) was openly critical and skeptical of the conclusion that India would not opt for an all-out war. He also voiced the view that in the event of war, the air force would not be able to provide the support that the army might seek as the territory belonged to the Indian side of LOC .But Gen Musharraf overruled them by saying that the Indians will not go on full blown war and will only raise objections over the occupation of the territory as the Govt Of India is bothered about its image in the world forum after PokharanII.

But the truth was something different, and Gen Musharraff had other plans. He had ordered the movement of troops and artillery to the forward areas and 5,000 of its troops from NLI (Northern Light Infantry)  were to infiltrate into various peaks in the Kargil sector. Some local Kashmiri militants from across the border were used, but only as porters. The NLI troops occupied a total of 132 posts.

Gen Musharaff always denied that they were the troops of the Pakistan army in front of the world and he even went to the extent to refused to take over the body of the fallen soldiers of Pakistan and had declared them as “NON STATE PLAYERS”. This he did despite the fact that the paybook and the Icard recovered from the dead soldiers clearly mentioned them to be soldiers of Northern Light Infantry of Pakistan. Can Gen Musharaff explain that how come “non state players” carry the pay book and I card of Pakistan army?

But the fact is when politicians and army officers speak off the records they tell a very different story, freely conceding that denials about Kargil were nothing more than barefaced lie concocted by Gen Musharaff's. The Northern Light Infantry, they admit, did cross the line of control and occupied the heights in Kargil and Drass sector. The truth is that, just as in 1947 and 1965, Pakistan tried to fudge its offensive by saying it was carried out by volunteers and not regular troops. In reality, the local kashmiri militants probably accounted for no more than 10 per cent of the total force and were given only portering duties.The troops were from  NLI and also included commandos from the Special Services Group.

Since CAS of Pakistan had objected to this madness operation of Gen Musharraf , CAS refused to co-operate and give air cover to Gen Musharaf stupid actions and endeavor against India and he was duely andunceremoniously sacked when Gen Musharraf took control of Pakistan administration in a coup deposing the then civil elected Govt of Pakistan.

After the counter offensive had started by the Indian army to regain the lost ground Gen Musharraf kept on denying in the media that Pakistan army was no way connected to ongoing battle.

Later on during the Kargil war, in an analysis of the Kargil operation by Mr Shaukat Qadir's  wanted the answer as why the Indian army (as reported by him in his analysis); "Under cover of fire, elements of 2 Rajputana Rifles captured what the Indians called ‘Tololing top ’,(Point 45907),the most dominating height directly overlooking Dras,on 12 June. An adjacent post was captured on 13 June, and Tiger Hills (Point 5140), another dominating height, fell on 20 June. The Pakistan army had continued to assert that no posts had fallen to the Indians, which reaffirms the contention that no effort was made to explain such a loss, or why it could not recur. However, in this case, it appears that prime Minister Nawaz Sharif found the Indian claims more credible than the Pakistan army’s denials. At ths point also Gen Musharaff shamelessly lied not only to the world media but also to his own countrymen and the civil administrator in Pakistan.

When one post after another was being captured by the gallant soldiers of India, Gen Mushharaf had to had to pull out men deployed at Siachin and reinforce Pakistan position in Kargil and Drass sector. That time Gen Musharraf realized that his dream has not been fulfilled and he had failed in his mission,he then again lied to prime minister Nawaz Sheriff  to negotiate peace with the Indian Govt so that Pakistan army dos not suffer further loss as it has already lost about 2700 men and officers, and have a face saving grace to pull out from that area.

In the entire Kargil operation Gen Pervez Musharraf has been a big liar and had not only lied to media but to his own fellow countrymen .To save his own skin and reputation, Gen Musharraf denied Pak army role which was far from truth and also saw that the bodies of the officers and men of the Pakistan were not taken back by the Pakistan Govt while negotiating peace.

This entire lies  and the behavior of Gen Musharraf should have been taken seriously by the Pakistan Govt and he should have been tried for treason and war crimes of the highest order by the Pakistan Govt, instead he now lives a lavish life in exile in Europe. To fulfill his devilish dreams Gen Pervez Musharraf sacrificed the life of about 3000officers and men of the Pakistan army. 

This deed of Gen Musharraf can be compared to that of Hitler and Mussolini who wanted to conquer the world and drove their countrymen to war and sacrificed them.

                                                                      To be contd……..

KARGIL WAR – UNTOLD FACTS -II

ROLE OF ARMY HQ AND ARMY TOP BRASS

In continuation to my previous post I will try to bring out the untold facts about casual and laid back attitude of the then GOC 3 Div Maj Gen V S Budhwar and the general staff officers (GS branch) of the HQ 3DIV.Also here I would like to mention few facts about the attitude of the then army chief COAS Gen V.P.Malikbefore the actual kargil operation undertaken by our gallant soldiers.

In todays newspaper (TOI) while laying wreath at the memorial built in the memory of our gallant soldiers, Gen Malik said and I quote”that the attack by Pakistan army and built up by them had taken the Indian army by surprise.”he further stated ‘at first we thought it were mere some militants who were trying to infiltrate .But as soon helicopters started to hover and arty fire began to fire , we were surprised to see bombardment from that side”

This statement from Gen V.P Malik surprised me a lot as it was already intimated to him by various letter written by general staff branch including Brig Surinder Sing (then Cdr of 121 Inf Bde) of 121 Inf Bde airing the views of possible attack from Kargil and drass sector and the massive movement of guns and troops by the Pakistan army as per the intelligence report.But Gen VP malik chose to ignore it, the reason for the same is best known to him only and only he can answer.But if Gen malik says he is surprised by the attack,and was not aware of the facts then someone should remind him that on August 25, 1998, Major R.K. Dwivedi, the Brigade-Major (BM 121 Inf Bde)of the 121 Brigade, sent out a letter and attached the letter  and the contents of Surinder Singh's proposed briefing of Gen V.P.Malik (then COAS) on the security situation in Kargil, scheduled to take place during the Chief of the Army Staff's visit to Kargil the following month. The 42-point document was, during the final presentation, backed by slides. The slides also included the intelligence report of the massive troop deployment across the border including movement of NLI (Northern Light Infantry of Pakistan).

Gen Malik, perhaps the most politician-friendly Army chief India has ever seen, responded to Brig. Surinder Singh's warnings of intensified conflict by burying his head in the sand.He ordered the 121 Brigade not to use heavy weapons to retaliate against Pakistan fire directed at National Highway 1A. A deal restricting the use of heavy weapons by both India and Pakistan was put in place after firing started on Kargil early in the summer of 1998. This, merely allowed Pakistan to rebuild its positions. More important, it was skewed to India's disadvantage. Malik, desperate for a deal, had allowed Pakistan to continue "interdicting NH 1A, as Air Defense was not included in the ban. Having put together some kind of peace in Kargil, even at the risk of advertising its post-Pokhran-II limitations, the top Army leadership was not about to listen to the alarms sounded by a mere Brigadier. Surinder Singh's requests for additional troops and air surveillance were variously ignored and shot down. 

In view of these facts it is clear the Gen V.P.Malik (then COAS) just ignored the warnings of the brigade and chose not to take any action on the reports sent by the 121 Inf Bde HQ.So the statement of Gen V.P.Malik (then COAS ) in today’s Times Of india is not true and he has hidden the true facts even today which has surprised me a lot as this proves that he is trying to shield the incompetence of the ministry of defense at the highest level during the BJP led govt at the center.

Role Of 3 Div HQ and Maj Gen V S Budhwar

On one side the brigade HQ was trying to sound alarming bells of the possible attack from across the border by sending numerous letter to the DIV HQ but the GS(operation) branch chose to ignore it. Numerous request for additional troops were turned down and above that to add salt to insult on the competence of Brig.Surinder Singh, the 3 Div ordered  the withdrawal of  9 Mahar Regiment, leaving the Yaldor area wide open.

The height of this is , instead of giving additional troop and air cover to the 121 Inf Bde,the brigade was ordered assist in building the “PET PROJECT”  Maj Gen V S Budhwar (then GOC 3 Div) which was a zoo for the resident of Leh. This  was communicated to the brigade HQ of 121 Inf Bde by a letter from  3 Div HQ and signed by Lt Col U.K.Singh in June 1998.Lt Col U.K.Singh in his letter stated that all the formation unit must procure various type of wild animals and birds for the project and no representation in this regards will be entertained at 3DIV HQ ,this being the “PET PROJECT “ of the then GOC 3DIV Gen V.S.Budhwar.

On one side the Cdr of 121 Inf  Bde was worried about possible attack and above that he received this type of letter ,inspite of repeated request for additional troops and air support, for Maj Gen V S Budhwar, the zoo was more important than the lives of the soldier who were killed later on during the Kargil conflict.

Major K.B.S. Khurana, the officer commanding the 1/S23 Intelligence and Field Security Unit at Kargil, had altogether other kinds of wildlife on his mind. He was referring to disturbing information brought to his attention by a source referred "that 500 Afghan militants have been brought to Gurikot, NJ 7959, to be further inducted into Ind ia in the near future." The "most likely route of infiltratio)" was through the Kel nala, on through the Safaid nala, into the Kaobal gali, and through to Pindras, Drass and Muskhoh. The information was graded fairly reliable.

Inspite of the intelligence reports received from brigade HQ (which had forwarded the report  of Maj K.B.S.Khurna) Maj Gen V S Budhwar , eh chose to ignore the early warnings of the brigade which resulted in heavy loss of life for our gallant officers and men in Kargil war.

Instead, the politically driven ostrich posture adopted at the highest levels of the Army command eventually shaped the institutional functioning of the 121 Brigade itself. After the loss of the battle over additional troops, weapons and air surveillance , drift appears to have set in. Winter patrols were set out largely on paper, and posts were often vacated when there was no real reason to do so. Maj Gen Budhwar's obsessive determination to avoid winter casualties in aggressive patrolling led Brig. Surinder Singh, in turn, to take a laid-back attitude after December. Maj Gen Budhwar's actions, for their part, appear to have been motivated by the conviction that the warnings generated on Kargil were frivolous, an attitude his superiors were only too happy to en ourage. The consequences of this apathy became evident when soldiers were brought back dead the next summer.

In view of the above facts  I can deduce, that It is clear that the build-up of irregulars detected by the Intelligence and Field Security Unit, as well as the movement of additional Pakistan troops into the Kargil sector, in fact constituted preparations for the war of 1999. It is also clear, with the wisdom of hindsight, that the 121 Brigade misinterpreted what it saw as preparations for infiltrating terrorists, rather than groundwork for a full-blown conventional engagement. But it is also worth noting that the Pakistan Army made elaborate arrangements to ensure that the first groups of its personnel who crossed the LoC were able to pretend to be irregulars. Had the warnings been taken seriously and requests for heightened surveillance and personnel been acceded to, it is at the very least possible  that Pakistan's early offensive would have been detected and engaged, saving hundreds of Indian soldiers' live

                                                                                            

                                                                                         To be contd……………

KARGIL WAR – UNTOLD FACTS - 1

1

ae lehad apni mitti se keh

de daag lagne na payee kafan ko

lipta hua hai safeed chadar me jo 

seecha hai khoon se usne watan ko 

# my tribute to the gallant soldiers who laid down their lives defending the nation#

Today India celebrates the 12^th anniversary of the troops victory in Kargil and Drass  sector.The battle at the heights were fought gallantry by our soldiers not only facing the enemy heavy arty and gun fire but also the weather and many of them did not return home. In this series of untold story of Kargil war, I will try to give some facts which has been untold and how our so called political bosses in New Delhi slept over the reports and preferred to burry their head in sand like an ostrich ,which resulted in heavy casualties for our troops.

The BJP govt headed by Sri Atal Behari Bajpayee and the then defence Minister Mr.George Fernandes not only ignored the early warning sent out by 121 Inf Bde but rubbished it as “over reaction to situation” by the army.

To substantiate my findings on the incompetence of the staff of ministry of defence and the then defence minister, I would like to quote following facts

On August 25, 1998, Major R.K. Dwivedi, the Brigade-Major of the 121 Brigade, sent out a letter about the contents of Brig.Surinder Singh's proposed briefing of GenMalik on the security situation in Kargil, scheduled to take place during the Chief of the Army Staff's visit to Kargil the following month. The 42-point document was, during the final presentation, backed by slides which was also presented to the then defense minister George Fernandez.

Right at the outset, the 121 Brigade briefing paper analyzed, in terse military shorthand, the possible "Enemy) Pattern" for the coming months. Pakistan would seek to keep conflict "alive after (the Pokhran-II) nuclear blasts and in view of the SAARC meeting of 29 Ju 98 and now for (the) NAM meeting." This could come in the form of a "push (by) militants across the LOC. Pakistan troops would, among other thing, engage NH (National Highway) IA with AD (Air Defence) weapons", "target selected forward posts", and "hit Kargil and outlying villages, if escalation of war takes place.

The letter also explained the "Enhanced Threat Perception", laid out the reasons for the 121 Brigade's apprehensions because fresh Pakistan troop movements, including the deployment of the 24 Sind Regiment, a reserve division from Gilgit, to forward positions at Olthingthang. Another battalion, the paragraph records, had moved "on priority" from Sialkot to Skardu. Heavy and medium guns had been inducted into the sector,along with M-1 98 155 millimetre mortar, and light flashes, possibly laser designators for smart weapons or missiles, had been seen over Drass and Kargil.

The Letter also gave detailed Vulnerabilities of the 121 Inf Bde and also pointed out the fact that National Highway 1A was vulnerable to fire from Pakistan positions on Twin Bumps, Bunker Ridge and Point 3249, Kargil and its rear areas were open to shelling. It laid out a whole new order of vulnerability. It pointed out that "infiltration routes were available through Mashkoh Valley, from Doda side to Panikhar, Yaldor and through nalas (streams)". Small detachments could be targeted, existence of posts were vulnerable to "rogue action".
121 Brigade left little doubt that trouble had already begun. 45 Pakistan soldiers dressed as  irregulars, had already moved across the LoC in the Kargil area. In order to address the emerging situation, the letter also gave a spectrum of new weapons, mainly heavy artillery and missiles, was urgently needed. It also called, for the use of "one air OP (observation flight) for observation and direction of fire/casualty evacuation to be located at Kargil". It also demanded the deployment of a remotely piloted vehicle, among other things, and a regular supply of aerial photos and satellite images. All these in the detail report submitted by 121 Inf bde  is worth noting, as the same were indeed used once the 1999 war broke out.
It is important to mention here that the Bharatiya Janata Party-led Union government just did not want to hear about trouble on the LoC. Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayeeand the then Defence Minister George Fernandez  had legitimized the Pokhran-II tests by describing nuclear weapons as "weapons of peace". A string of the kinds of people who pass for intellectuals in the BJP had in turn insisted that Pokhran-II, and indeed Pakistan's retaliatory tests at Chagai, would usher in a new era of peace in South Asia.

Having put together some kind of peace in Kargil, even at the risk of advertising its post-Pokhran-II limitations, the top leaders of BJP led govt at the centre  and the defence minister was not ready to listen to the alarms sounded by a mere Brig.Surinder Singh's ( the then Cdr of 121 Inf Bde and himself a decorated soldier and a battle casualty) and his requests for additional troops and air surveillance were variously ignored and shot down and taken very lightly at the Ministry of Defence.

121 Inf Bde further dispatched letters after letter requesting  for additional asking for heightened wide-area surveillance was also turned down and were informed not to shout “bediya aaya bediya aaya (cry wolf coming).The then  Captain Vikas Vohra, officiating for the Brigade Major(BM 121 Inf Bde)sent another letter and requested again for  "one helicopter flight / single heptr to be positioned permanently at Kargil for  wide  area surveillance(WASO) was also turned down. This led to further frustration among the officers of the 121 Inf Bde as they were aware of the ground reality and were not prepared if any form of intrusion or attack from that sector because of lack of air support and intelligence report ,which could have had by air surveillance of that area.

Capt.Vohra's letter made plain the need for heightened air surveillance. "Declaring Mashkoh nala as Priority IV, "needs to be reviewed in view of the flow of intelligence reports, listing out militant activity opposite Mashkoh valley. It therefore surely merits a higher priority. With these troops scheduled for removal, Vohra's letter pointed out, weekly WASO flights were also needed in the Garkhun and Hanuthang nalas as well.

Division formation HQ took the best part of a fortnight to get back to this letter. Major V.K. Chattre, General Staff Officer 2 (GSO2) of the Div HQ wasted few words. "Your proposal is not approved," in reply to Capt Vohra’s lettter. 15 Corps Headquarters at that time in charge of the 3 Infantry Division, did not see fit to intervene in the debate. Requests for additional troops were not even graced with a reply. One letter generated by the 121 Brigade's Major R.K. Dwivedi, on behalf  of Brig.Surinder Singh (then Cdr 121 inf Bde)gave report of a recent mine explosion on the highway, and underlined the need for troops to protect the road and vulnerable villages. No troops were deployed. Instead, despite the 121 Brigade's protests, the 9 Mahar Regiment was actually withdrawn, leaving the Yaldor area wide open.

Though the officers of the 121 Inf Bde kept on sending signals and messages to their higher formation about the threat perception, but the top brass and the Political leaders just chose to ignore it and did not paid any heed to it.

It was clear in the minds of the officer and Cdr of 121 Inf Bde that the build-up of irregulars detected by the Intelligence and Field Security Unit, as well as the movement of additional Pakistan troops into the Kargil sector, in fact constituted preparations for the war of 1999. It is also clear, with the wisdom of hindsight, that the 121 Brigade misinterpreted what it saw as preparations for infiltrating terrorists, rather than groundwork for a full-blown conventional engagement. But it is also worth noting that the Pakistan Army made elaborate arrangements to ensure that the first groups of its personnel who crossed the LoC were able to pretend to be irregulars. Had the warnings been taken seriously and requests for heightened surveillance and personnel been acceded to, it is at the very least possible that Pakistan's early offensive would have been detected and engaged, saving hundreds of Indian soldiers' lives.

Instead of heading to the advice and giving Brig Surinder Singh ,SM,VSM his capabilities was doubted and the politically driven ostrich posture adopted at the highest levels of the defense ministry eventually shaped the institutional functioning of the 121 Brigade itself. After the loss of the battle over additional troops, weapons and air surveillance , drift appears to have set in. Winter patrols were set out largely on paper, and posts were often vacated when there was no real reason to do so. Sources say Budhwar's obsessive determination to avoid winter casualties in aggressive patrolling led Brig.Surinder Singh, in turn, to take a laid-back attitude after December as like the winter setting in Kashmir, frustration had set in him. The consequences of this apathy became evident when soldiers were brought back dead the next summer.

                                                                                                                      To be contd……..

IT CAN HAPPEN ONLY IN INDIA - MOTHER OF ALL SCAM

Well we all have heard that a women can only deliver babies but don’t get surprised after reading this …as this scam was unearthed a few days back in Rajasthan. The bureaucrats and babus of India have become so daring and fearless that they think that they can get away with anything as they have learnt from their political masters.

Here is a report filed by one of the reporters >>>>>

Men in this Rajasthan district can deliver babies. Surprised? This is the claim of a health centre.

The local health department has unearthed a scam at Gogunda Community Health Centre in Kotda town, where at least 32 men are recorded to have delivered babies,as per a senior official who is investigating the scandal.
The pregnancy assistants of the centre allegedly provided false delivery details to obtain government aid meant for below poverty line (BPL) pregnant women under the centrally sponsored scheme, the 'Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY)'.

Names of at least 32 men (can you believe that as for me it is really very hilarious), claiming to have delivered babies at the centre, are mentioned in the records, as per the official .
"Many of them have been mentioned several times in the records," he said.

The pregnancy ward's head has made entries of 250 deliveries in one year, the official said.
Records claim that a 60-year-old woman delivered babies twice within a year. Another woman named Sita is shown to have delivered 24 babies in a year (some sort of world record and deserves mention in book of records).

The pregnancy ward's head has herself claimed to have delivered 11 babies in a year, the officer said.
"She had been removed immediately after the scam came to light, but now she is missing," the official said.
A complaint will be lodged after completion of a departmental enquiry, he said.
"A team of three senior doctors has been constituted," he added.

The JSY aims to reduce the number of maternal and neonatal deaths among pregnant women of BPL (below poverty line), above 19 years of age and up to two live births. It integrates help in the form of cash with antenatal care during the pregnancy period, institutional care during delivery as well as immediately after delivery. 



When I read this news, I was just dazed and could not believe my eyes what I was reading.I have heard about money laundering, 2G scam,Land Grabbing  scam, CWG scam but this one beats all of them hands down so we can say this one is the MOTHER OF ALL THE SCAM.

Recent rape charges against army in Kashmir

Further to my blog regarding the ongoing slur campaign  against Indian armed forces in a rape case in Kashmir, I would like to quote some text from the  report of the same case by correspondent of Deccan Chronicle.He reported the following facts : (http://www.deccanchronicle.com/channels/nation/north/family-contradicts-womans-version-rape-charge-441)
The rape controversy took a new turn when the husband and mother-in-law of the woman claimed before police that she suffered from mental illness and was at her home in South Kashmir on the day she claimed she was sexually abused.
The statement of the family members of Ruqaya, 32, goes contrary to her claim that she was picked up by two men in uniform on July 19 and allegedly gang-raped for two days before being let off on July 21.
In her statement to the Special Investigation Team (SIT) yesterday, Amina Bi, mother-in-law of the alleged victim, said that her daughter-in-law went missing on the morning of July 20 and not evening of July 19.
"She (Ruqaya) had gone to a spring at 7.00 a.m on Wednesday (July 20) and did not return till late in the evening. We sent people in different directions but could not find her. She returned home the next day," Amina told the SIT officials.
Amina said she asked her daughter-in-law about her overnight absence but she did not say anything. "She started beating her chest and I thought she is having some pain. We took her to Manzgam hospital where she told the doctor that she had been raped," the woman said.
Ruqaya had alleged that she was kidnapped by two men in uniform on the evening of July 19 and held hostage for two nights during which she was raped in a "Dhok" at Manzgam, 80 kms from here.
What more will come out please wait as this appears a clear case by some vested interest to malign the of armed forces in Kashmir valley  (hands of separatist leaders cannot be ruled out after the arrest Of Dr Gulam Md Fai in USA as many separatist leaders have enjoyed the hospitality of Dr fai)